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Abstract: 
This article considers the role and increasing influence of the media in internal 
Labour Party affairs.  Consideration is given to the activities of three ‘auxiliary’ 
institutions that became central actors within party debates during the leadership 
of Neil Kinnock.  These are the external agenda-setting print media popular 
amongst party members; the opinion research based on questioning of the 
electorate or, more specifically, those seen as potential Labour supporters; and, 
managing both the media and research, the burgeoning cadre of specialist advisers 
and aides working for the leader.  The latter part of the paper looks at the defining 
moment of Tony Blair’s three year period as Labour leader in opposition, that is 
his successful attempt to re-write the party’s statements of aims and values 
including the revered Clause Four.  It will be shown how Blair used the reformed 
party structures bequeathed him by predecessor Kinnock to manage discussion 
and deliver a victory not certain at the outset of the debate.  In winning the 
argument, the leadership demonstrated how its powerful position derives not just 
from its place in the party hierarchy but also from its ability to use the media to 
structure and control debate. 
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Introduction. 
On 29th April 1995 Labour held a special interim conference to conclude a discussion 
over the party constitution begun six months earlier by leader Tony Blair.  In front of 
the assembled delegates was a single motion calling for the replacement of the 75 year 
old clause that contains the organisational ‘mission statement’ of aims and values.  The 
resolution, carried by a comfortable margin, succeeded in overturning a restatement of 
faith in the old constitution passed at the 1994 Annual Conference, paradoxically the 
event which had launched the debate.  More remarkable than the special conference 
result was the symbolism of a major Labour meeting slow hand-clapping National 
Union of Mineworkers' leader Arthur Scargill for questioning the legitimacy of the 
proceedings.  The treatment of Scargill, who ten years previously won Annual 
Conference support in spite of strong opposition from the Kinnock leadership, was 
indicative of a changed party culture.  This perception was reinforced by the warm 
response given Blair and his supporters.  The reasons for this transformation, and the 
contribution of political marketing to it, form the basis of discussion in this article. 
 
The notion that there is an inherent tendency towards the centralisation of power within 
a party was first popularised by Robert Michels.  In his influential study of the German 
Social Democrats, Michels argued that organisational democracy was a practical 
impossibility due to the inherent tendency of the hierarchy or leadership to centralise 
power within itself.  This, he argued was 'the iron law of oligarchy'.i  Significantly 
Michels, in developing his thesis, noted the importance of the media:  ‘The press 
constitutes a potent instrument for the conquest, the preservation and the consolidation 
of power on the part of the leaders’. 
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Applied to Labour Michels’ thesis appeared to have some validity, at least until the 
trauma of 1931 when the then leader and prime minister Ramsay MacDonald deserted 
his party to set up in coalition government with the Conservatives.  Since then the 
internal politics of the organisation have been characterised as a vibrant, sometimes 
unmanageable 'broad church' coalition of interests though the varying success of 
leadership in maintaining control of the party has been discussed by McKenzie, and by 
Shaw.ii  This paper is concerned with examining how and why the present 'New' Labour 
leadership have been able successfully to subjugate dissident factions in a way which 
would appear to give renewed relevance to Michels' thesis.  Particular attention will be 
paid to the way certain agenda-setting media have been used by the main agents 
responsible for the party's transformation.   
 
The initial part of the discussion will examine the organisational legacy Neil Kinnock 
bequeathed to his successors John Smith and Tony Blair.  It will be shown how new 
structures consolidated during the marketing driven Policy Review enabled the 
leadership to exert considerable control over a once notoriously fractious party to the 
extent that Labour rather than the Conservatives now enjoys a reputation for being 
disciplined and centralised.  The piece will conclude by examining the debate 
surrounding Tony Blair’s successful attempt to re-write the aims of the party as set out 
in its constitution.  It will be demonstrated how Blair was able to use the new 
institutional arrangements to win the case for a revision of the document and, in 
particularly, its revered Clause Four. Arguably the defining moment in Blair’s three 
years as leader of the Opposition, the move proved critical to the relaunch of the party 
as ‘New’ Labour. 
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The Kinnock Legacy. 
The Policy Review of 1987-90 marked a watershed in modern Labour Party history.  An 
exercise that repositioned the Party nearer what was perceived to be the electoral 
centreground, the Review served as an important strategic turning point.  Labour 
embraced a more intensive, marketing focused approach to campaigning.  Consequently 
the use of professional research and consultancy, once limited to party publicity 
activities, began to inform policy formulation.iii  This change, made in the aftermath of a 
third consecutive election defeat, has proved to be of critical importance to the 
centralisation and retention of power by each of the three successive leadership teams 
that have presided since 1987. 
 
The function of 'agenda-setting' is central to understanding why the Policy Review and 
subsequent leadership exercises have played such an important role in restructuring the 
party.  Cohen distinguished the core feature of this concept when he wrote:  ‘the press 
may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is 
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about’.  Having been 
popularised in a celebrated study of election campaigning,iv Steven Lukes adopted the 
phrase agenda-setting to identify what he termed one of the three 'faces' of power that 
determine outcomes within an organisation.v  Similarly, in their assessments of internal 
Labour Party bargaining procedures, both Minkin, and Koelble, point to the importance 
of agenda-setting in framing internal debate.vi  Both studies concentrate on analysing 
organisational decision-making during the 1970s and early 1980s, a period characterised 
by 'crisis management' and dominated by a concerted attempt to shift power away from 
the Labour leadership at Westminster.  Those in the vanguard calling for reform, mainly 
left-wingers active in the trade unions and at grassroots' level, focused their efforts on 
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setting the agenda of Labour's Annual Conference.  As Henry Drucker noted this 
supreme decision-making body, labelled the 'parliament of the movement' by former 
leader Clement Attlee, meant a delegatory form of self-governance embodying a 
commitment to internal democracy.vii 
 
When it was founded there was a degree of accountability within the Labour Party 
largely absent in the more hierarchical organisations of political opponents, some state 
institutions and commercial firms including those owning and running mass media 
interests.  An organisation whose political influence has grown with the progress of the 
Twentieth Century, the mass media have traditionally been viewed with hostility by 
many Labour partisans and trades unionists.  Ironically the same external media now 
play an important role in the internal governance of the party, helping the leadership 
maintain control of the organisation and dominate debate.  This development has had 
important consequences for Labour's previously federal, participatory structures. 
 
To better understand the changed nature of party organisation the next sections will 
consider the increasingly central role played by three ‘auxiliary’ institutions in shaping 
and determining decision-making outcomes.viii  Firstly, and most importantly, there has 
been the growth in size and importance of a leadership bureau of full-time staff and 
part-time advisers responsible for implementing and, increasingly, devising strategy.  
With the emergence of this elite there has been a parallel growth in the party’s reliance 
on another auxiliary in the form of a select group of external media contacts.  In return 
for privileged access, these media outlets have been responsible for the subtle conduit of 
pro-leadership viewpoints to the general and, more importantly, internal party publics.  
Finally, in terms of the input side to the debate, there has been increasing preoccupation 
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on the part of the hierarchy and its bureaucracy with the attitudes of those deemed to be 
floating voters and thus essential to any electoral success.  These opinions, as 
enunciated in polling research, have guided the thinking of the leadership, its agents and 
media outlets to the extent that the views of potential Labour supporters have 
manifested themselves as another highly influential auxiliary institution. 
 
The New Party Machinery. 
The strategic changes forged during and after the Policy Review helped centralise 
power within the Labour leadership who, by skilful use of external media channels, 
were able to co-ordinate internal agenda-setting and continually outmanoeuvre rival 
factions and malcontents.  The notion of increased professionalism aiding the 
emergence of elitist parties is not new.  In the 1960s, political scientist Leon Epstein 
drew attention to this relationship when he used the term 'contagion from the right' to 
describe the possible emergence of American style cadre parties in Europe.ix  More 
recently Panebianco has focused on the growing importance of the ‘electoral 
professionals’.x  Writing at the time of Labour's Policy Review, Tribune editor Phil 
Kelly forecast the potential beginnings of such a realignment of power in the party: 
 'If it becomes a mass party which takes it membership seriously, and involves 
them in policy-making and implementation, then it will need a system of internal 
management based on consensus.  If it descends into a media-orientated 
marketing organisation for top politicians, then it will need internal discipline 
which will make the fifties seem liberal by comparison.'xi 
 
Prior to the late 1980s agenda-setting in the Labour Party was chiefly understood to 
mean the ability of leaders, groups and factions to influence policy and organisational 
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decisions through the mobilisation of internal opinion.  The party’s strategic 
development has intensified these actors' reliance on external mass media as a vehicle 
for political communication.  This relationship has transformed the basis of internal 
agenda-setting and contributed to an erosion in the once strong horizontal decision-
making structures, most obviously the Annual Conference and Constituency Labour 
Parties(CLPs).xii  Where opinion formers once strove to put their case across in labour 
movement papers like Voice of the Unions and Tribune, they now seek to use 
sympathetic external media such as The Guardian, The Independent and Daily Mirror 
to disseminate their viewpoint. 
 
Given its already privileged position, a leadership with coherent strategies has 
significant leverage over party rivals.  This advantage has been enhanced by the 
growing role of the mass media, an aspect of contemporary politics recognised in two of 
the most thorough recent investigations into Labour Party structures.  Observing the 
evolution of the party in the early 1990s, Lewis Minkin was swift to identify the 
growing presidentialisation of the organisation.  Referring to its leader, he noted: 
'His office now housed an unprecedented proliferation of aides, assistants and 
advisers, with an overview of, and involvement in, all aspects of Party activity 
and all  dimensions of the links with the unions.  In effect there was now an 
Executive Office of the Leader...(providing) the basis of a centralised power 
structure unique in Labour Party history.'xiii 
 
The 'Executive', that is the Leader's Office at Westminster, derived its political authority 
from close working relationships with Kinnock.  Senior Office aides, together with 
those in the party’s Campaigns' Directorate and with senior marketing advisers, formed 
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what Shaw calls the new 'strategic community'.xiv  Together these overlapping bodies 
have helped centralise power within the party to an even greater extent than that 
managed by Harold Wilson and his famed kitchen cabinet.xv  The success of this 
strategy has been reflected in elections for the 29 member National Executive 
Committee(NEC), the institution at the apex of the extra-parliamentary party, which has 
seen a slow erosion in the number of leadership critics(which formed a majority in the 
late 1970s) to the point in 1993-94 when all dissident voices were temporarily voted off 
the body. 
 
Another aspect to the centralisation of power has been the increasing prominence of the 
political public relations expert or 'spin doctor' as epitomised by Peter Mandelson.  First 
as Director of Labour Party Campaigns and Communications in the second half of the 
1980s and subsequently as MP for Hartlepool, Minister without Portfolio and a 
confidante of Tony Blair, Mandelson's name has become synonymous with 
controversy.xvi  It is difficult to think of any other Labour official since former General 
Secretary Morgan Philips who has been regarded with similar awe by both allies and 
opponents in the party.  Whilst most of this comment has focused on the supposed skill 
and deviousness of Mandelson as an adviser, much of it fails to appreciate or obscures 
the reality that his position of strength derives from a close working relationship with 
the leader in an evolving political culture which increasingly affords the mass media a 
greater influence over party affairs.  It is perhaps significant that Arthur Scargill, in 
drawing up his blueprint for his own rival Socialist Labour Party, acknowledged the 
power of New Labour 'spin doctors' as one of the reasons for breaking with his old 
colleagues.xvii 
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The Media of Agenda-Setting. 
In tandem with its growing influence within the party, the bureaucracy has attempted to 
mobilise opinion in favour of the leadership through the cultivation of external media 
contacts.  This section discusses the way in which this activity has restructured debate 
and accountability within the party and further aided the centralisation of power. 
 
Before the Policy Review agenda-setting within the Labour Party centred on influencing 
decisions made by Annual Conference and implemented in the interim by its NEC.  
Public debate centred around left journals Tribune, New Statesman and now defunct 
party titles like Labour Weekly and New Socialist.  After 1987, as the strategic 
orientation of the party began to change, the potential influence of external media 
broadly favourable to Labour increased.  Since then newspapers with an anti-
Conservative bias like The Guardian and Daily Mirror have become important for the 
dissemination of new ideas and thinking throughout the party and especially within the 
elite at Westminster and CLP level.  In addition such material often serves as a useful 
cue for broadcast media reports of internal Labour business. 
 
The Guardian, collectively owned by the Scott Trust, regularly features writers 
sympathetic to the liberal left and the Blair leadership in particular.  Recently these have 
included John Gray, Geoff Mulgan, Martin Kettle and Chair of the Trust Hugo Young.  
Together with much of the newspaper's political coverage in the period 1992-95, these 
columnists have tended to exhibit a positive attitude towards the ‘modernisation’ of 
Labour project.  Admittedly there are contributors hostile to ‘New’ Labour such as 
Francis Wheen, Paul Foot and Steve Bell, but their opinions tend to diverge from the 
newspaper's editorials.  When set against the overt partisanship of pro-Conservative 
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qualities The Times and Daily Telegraph it is unsurprising that The Guardian fills a 
void in the market with its support for Labour and, on certain occasions, the Liberal 
Democrats.  However, when considered in intra-party terms, this coverage has added 
significance because it invariably favours the Labour 'moderniser' position as opposed 
to what have been collectively labelled 'traditionalists'.xviii 
 
The other major Labour supporting newspaper, the Daily Mirror, has a long history of 
endorsing successive party leaderships.  During the recent 1995 Annual Conference the 
title and its political editor John Williams were particularly strong in their advocacy of 
the leadership position following the education debate, the most controversial of the 
week.xix  The paper has also co-sponsored the official Labour Party 'Red Rose' tour 
designed to attract new members and, in theory at least, more readers.  Despite 
occasional disagreements, such as the call by the Daily Mirror for the resignation of 
Harriet Harman following the MP's decision to send her son to a selective school, 
editorials have tended enthusiastically to endorse the positions of Tony Blair and his 
supporters. 
 
Both The Guardian and Daily Mirror enjoy circulations well in excess of an individual 
Labour membership estimated to be in the region of 300 to 350,000.  Predictably there 
is considerable shared allegiance to the party and those titles deemed most supportive of 
it.  Seyd and Whiteley calculate 35% of members read The Guardian, 27% the Daily 
Mirror/Record, 7% The Independent and 15% others.  Only 13% read no national 
newspaper.xx  The first two titles alone boast more members as readers than the 
combined sales of Labour supporting publications like Tribune, New Statesman, Labour 
Left Briefing, Chartist and Red Pepper, all of which have run editorials critical of the 
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leadership from a left perspective in the period between 1992 and 1995.  Whilst these 
titles rely on small circulations of a few thousand, The Guardian alone sells between 
400 to 500,000 copies per day and has an estimated readership of at least twice that.  As 
the Labour Party metamorphoses from an organisation based upon strong horizontal 
structures into a more top-down leadership driven vehicle, the potentially pivotal role of 
these national newspapers becomes more obvious.  This is especially the case as the 
party moves towards embracing 'One Member, One Vote' for the selection of 
parliamentary candidates, leadership elections and referenda on constitutional and 
policy matters. 
 
The growing links between Labour leaders and their supporters in the press provide 
them with an important source of practical as well as psychological support.  
Additionally the intensification in contacts between media and party has helped cement 
the relationship between journalists and the new core of political professionals, some of 
whom are one and the same.  This has had a significant impact on the culture of the 
party, with the emergent 'strategic community' conveying a very different impression of 
Labour to that previously presented by the affiliates in the trade union movement.  This 
increasing professionalisation of politics, and the central importance it attaches to 
deliberations between middle-class graduates on the Labour frontbench and in the 
media, signals a change of emphasis in an organisation whose proletarian heritage and 
image used to differentiate it from rival parties.xxi 
 
The Importance of Marketing Research. 
Private polling, that is opinion research commissioned by parties, is not new to British 
politics.  Nevertheless the importance attached to this form of data as a source of 
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electoral feedback has grown in recent years and is borne out by an increase in the 
amount as well as the type of polls being commissioned.  Where parties once relied on 
quantitative opinion research methods such as the large-scale survey they are now also 
funding ongoing qualitative studies of voter attitudes in the form of focus groups.  
Typically these focus groups consist of about 6 to 10 people sharing a weak partisanship 
and/or similar socio-economic background.  A trained moderator facilitates a recorded 
discussion which aims to explore voters' deeper seated value and attitude structures in 
order to put the answers given to quantitative surveys in perspective. 
 
Parties have long used small group discussions in their electioneering work:  the inter-
war period saw the Conservatives holding cottage coffee mornings whilst Labour relied 
on impromptu back street meetings to target the electorally important group of women 
voters.  Though both efforts were primarily propagandist in intent, they constituted a 
potentially instructive source of feedback.  In the strict sense of the term, focus group 
research became a strategic reality for parties with the advent of more adventurous 
election advertising campaigns in the 1960s and 1970s.xxii  Interest in these methods 
intensified during the 1980s when the Conservatives experimented with various 
qualitative tools and the Labour run Greater London Council used similar methods to 
some effect in a memorable attempt to stave off its own abolition.xxiii 
 
During the Kinnock leadership focus group research became an important means by 
which Labour monitored changing trends in popular opinion.  From 1985 to the 1987 
election qualitative studies of public attitudes were commissioned on an ad hoc basis.  
Later, during the Policy Review, focus group data relating the opinions of floating 
voters became integral to debate.xxiv  These results, together with quantitative survey 
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data, helped to provide some of the momentum behind subsequent changes in policy 
and organisation.  It was a factor Kinnock acknowledged as crucial to the exercise 
because, as he saw it, the process was 'reinforced periodically by using the Shadow 
Communications Agency to give presentations which...  assisted in the efforts to sustain 
the movement of the Review in the desired direction'.xxv 
 
Similarly, in the aftermath of the 1992 election defeat, focus group findings once again 
became an important source of information for Labour leaders trying to make sense of 
the result.  If anything the deep scepticism towards the accuracy of traditional polling 
evident following the 1992 campaignxxvi has created a climate in which greater value is 
attached to the findings of qualitative based political research.  This has had a 
significant impact on strategic debates inside the Labour Party. 
 
The rest of this paper turns to discuss more recent political developments, specifically 
the six month debate over the Labour Party constitution that took place between late 
1994 and early 1995.  For historian Brian Brivati the issues raised in this period 
underlined Labour’s past organisational ‘conservatism’ and attachment to a set of 
institutional arrangements which, he argued, had been ‘retained because of their 
historical importance rather than their contemporary relevance.'xxvii  Central to this 
discussion were disagreements over Clause Four.  Despite being only a part of the 
constitution, the extract was the only part of the document subjected to real scrutiny and 
argument.  Indeed in discussing the outcome of the debate, media commentators 
frequently spoke of Tony Blair’s having been successful in re-writing Clause Four 
rather than the whole statement of aims that defined the  
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Clause Four. 
Since the Labour Party constitution was formally drafted in 1918 its fourth clause has 
traditionally been regarded as the organisational mission statement.  The importance 
attached to the declaration was underlined in the late 1950s when Clause Four(part IV) 
began to appear on each annual issue of party membership cards.xxviii  Heavily symbolic, 
these sentences provide the backdrop to one of the most contentious debates to take 
place in the history of the party. 
 
The Controversy over Clause Four. 
The importance of Clause Four or, more specifically, part IV derives from its stated aim 
of achieving a more equitable society through the pursuit of public ownership 
programmes.  Drawn up by leading Labour intellectual Sidney Webb in 1918, the 
statement reflected the party's aspiration to emancipate people via greater socialisation 
of the economy.  Following the end of the Attlee administration in 1951 it became clear 
not every Labour politician agreed with the aim of Clause Four, by now widely 
interpreted as a call for the extension of nationalisation in light of the government 
programme implemented during the late 1940s.  So-called 'revisionist' objections to the 
notion of realising party goals through state ownership formed the basis of Anthony 
Crosland's influential book The Future of Socialism.xxix 
 
Following Labour's third successive election defeat in 1959, leader Hugh Gaitskell 
moved to try and change the wording of Clause Four in the belief that party policy on 
nationalisation was electorally unsaleable at a time of perceived economic affluence and 
security.  In his attempts to change the constitution, Gaitskell found himself blocked by 
a powerful coalition inside the party consisting of trades unionists and left-wingers.  
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Though he ultimately failed in his bid to delete the wording, Gaitskell nevertheless 
succeeded in showcasing and making Clause Four central to the party’s identity. 
 
Though the party card continued to retain the Clause, few subsequent policy 
pronouncements made use of the wording.  Following the Policy Review of the late 
1980s public ownership as a strategy of economic management was abandoned as a 
priority for an incoming Labour government.  After the 1992 general election 
indifference on the part of some towards Clause Four began to turn into outright 
hostility.  Bill Jordan, President of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, was vocal in 
his call for the scrapping of the wording.xxx  Soon after, Campaigns Co-ordinator Jack 
Cunningham also urged the abandonment of Clause Four.xxxi  The following year, in the 
middle of the so-called 'Clintonisation' debate over whether Labour should move further 
into the political centreground, the idiosyncratic MP Frank Field declared his opposition 
to Clause Four,xxxii a view echoed by an editorial in The Times a week later.xxxiii 
 
Speculation over a possible re-write of the constitution increased with the publication of 
a pamphlet by leading moderniser Jack Straw questioning the party wisdom of relying 
on the by now 75 year old Clause.xxxiv  Influential support for Straw came from a Fabian 
Society inquiry into the party constitution presided over by Lord Peter Archer which 
pointedly refused to include the old wording in its proposed revised version of the 
document.xxxv  Those pressing for reform were joined by Roy Hattersleyxxxvi and 
eventually, in a later but symbolically important intervention, former leader Neil 
Kinnock who concluded his BBC television documentary Tomorrow's Socialism by 
making reference to the issue.xxxvii 
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Despite the obvious enthusiasm of some in the party for changing the constitution, 
Clause Four was reaffirmed at the 1993 Annual Conference.  Support for the old 
wording could even be found in the key moderniser journal Renewal.xxxviii  For his part 
Labour leader John Smith was decidedly agnostic in public when asked about the 
matter.xxxix  His attitude appeared to dampen speculation about the possibility of reform 
up until his untimely death in 1994.  When Tony Blair, the favoured candidate to 
succeed Smith to the Labour leadership, was asked by David Frost whether he would 
press for changes to the party constitution he replied: 
 'I don't think anyone actually wants the abolition of Clause Four to be the priority of 
 the Labour Party at the moment.  I don't think that anyone is saying now, in the run 
 up to an election, that this is what we should focus on.  The vast majority of the 
 British people don't sit out there and debate the intricacies of the Labour Party 
 constitution.'xl 
 
Blair's sentiments appeared to reflect mainstream opinion within the party.  As seasoned 
political commentator Paul Anderson pointed out during a leadership election campaign 
which itself had followed on from the momentous decision to adopt 'One Member, One 
Vote': '...no one is suggesting that further reforms of the Labour constitution are on the 
cards this side of an election'.xli 
 
Within three months of taking up the party leadership Blair changed his mind and, in his 
first Annual Conference address at the helm, publicly stated his intention to go for a re-
write of Clause Four.  Declaring 'Let us say what we mean and mean what we say', Blair 
never mentioned the Clause by name during the speech, choosing to rely on his press 
officers to point out the specifics to assembled broadcasters and journalists.  If the 
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declaration excited the media it did not move delegates in formal debate two days later.  
Proposed by Glasgow Maryhill CLP delegate Jim Mearns, a motion calling for the 
reaffirmation of Clause Four led to impassioned speeches from defenders including 
David Winnick MP and opponents, notably communication workers' union leader Alan 
Johnson and modernising MP Denis MacShane.  The motion was passed by a narrow 
margin, the front-page of The Guardian tersely reporting 'Vote for past defies leader'.xlii  
Inside the same edition, the setback was reported to have been 'airily dismissed' by the 
Blair camp.  The next time the subject came to be debated by a national Labour 
conference the way in which the agenda was framed would be considerably more 
favourable to the leadership. 
 
The Momentum behind Blair. 
In putting their case for reform of Clause Four, modernisers such as Blair argued 
Labour needed to update the party constitution to show it embodied 'a radical and 
realistic vision of democratic socialism for the next millennium'.xliii  Adopting a similar 
tone Janet Anderson, Secretary of the Tribune Group of MPs, argued the need for an 
effective 'mission statement': 
 'At a recent meeting of the Tribune Group, the editor of Tribune Newspaper said he 
 would be worried if the debate about Clause Four became simply one about 
 'Marketing' the party.  But that is precisely what we have to do.  We have to persuade 
 people to our point of view.  Every time we campaign, we seek to market the Labour 
 Party... But, in order to do it, we need a clear message of what we stand for.'xliv 
 
In addition to the apparent electoral capital to be made out of the exercise, a successful 
re-write would likely increase Blair's status both within the party and with the general 
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public at large. 
 
In their plans to reform Clause Four, the leadership had a considerable organisational 
advantage over their opponents not least because they were able to use party funds and 
guaranteed television airtime to support their campaigning.  Two editions of the Labour 
Party News(LPN), the regular publication mailed to all members, ran prominent features 
on the debate.  Despite the absence of an officially sanctioned alternative to the existing 
Clause Four, the special issue distributed in January 1995 included contributions from 
nine leading party figures broadly favourable to change with only three against.  The 
following edition of LPN in March reported on the soundings Tony Blair had been 
taking with regional meetings of Labour members.  Mirroring the Clinton approach to 
campaigning, the Labour leadership also commissioned a video that was sent out to 
complement local branch discussions of a specially drawn up Clause Four consultation 
document.  Despite the apparent openness of the process, sections of the party were 
concerned about the implications of the debate.  One member, John Solomon, summed 
up this body of opinion when he noted: 
 'We were bombarded by propaganda from Walworth Road, including a special 
edition of LP News, the content of which was largely in favour of change and a 
glossy covered booklet.  There was also a colourful video to help with the 
questions, even laying out the time which should be spent in replying to each 
section of the values.  Peculiarly enough, during all this time there were no 
proposals of any actual change to be made to Clause Four; no real substance to 
consider, only a reiteration of values and three vague issues to which a response 
had to be made.  So much for weeks of consultation; a very costly exercise, a 
softening up process, known in marketing terminology as 'demand plasticity'.   
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(I)t was a marketing ploy.  And this massive  consultation(sic) programme was 
going to be processed by March 15th? Poor Walworth Road.  How did they 
manage or did they?  In fact, the new Clause IV was made public on March 
13th.  Many of us wish we could receive our renewed L(abour) P(arty) 
membership cards as quickly as that.'xlv 
 
Blair and the modernising camp also benefited from something they could not have 
foreseen for certain: a divided opposition. 
 
The surprise when the leader launched debate over Clause Four was visible later that 
evening on the Midnight Special programme.xlvi  Featuring two Labour MPs closely 
aligned on the centre-left, the discussion led them to differing interpretations of the 
day's event.  For his part Peter Hain recognised that to mount a serious campaign 
against the leadership might undermine Blair's authority in the party and with the wider 
public.  By contrast Jean Corston lamented the debate was taking place at all, primarily 
because it deflected attention away from what she perceived to be the issues and 
problems facing her constituents. 
 
The cautious approach of Corston and Hain was mirrored by the newsletter of their 
parliamentary 'What's Left' caucus.  This recognised the dilemma facing the Labour left 
should they campaign to keep, reword or add to the existing Clause Four.xlvii  The latter 
positions, respectively championed by the joint Tribune and New Statesman editorial 
teams and London MEP Stan Newens, helped complicate the debate.  The other 
viewpoint was supported by the appropriately named 'Defend Clause Four' campaign 
which received backing from MPs and MEPs in the left-wing Socialist Campaign 
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Group together with a few members of other factions, most notably right-winger 
Gwyneth Dunwoody and centrist Andrew MacKinlay.xlviii  Like the other left 
campaigns, publicity material from the Group stressed the need to maintain the party's 
stated belief in public ownership as a way 'to realise our commitment to equality, 
freedom and social justice'.xlix 
 
Blair, then, enjoyed a significant advantage over his opponents given his organisational 
resources and the relative simplicity and unified theme of his case.  In addition, the 
modernisers' position was once again augmented by use of media sources and opinion 
poll data. 
 
The Use of Agenda-setting. 
The wisdom of Blair's decision to re-write Clause Four appeared to be challenged by 
Gallup opinion poll results published in the middle of the debate.  These findings 
contrasted with earlier MORI data which had suggested floating voters would be more 
likely to support Labour if the Clause was changed.l  Reported in the Daily Telegraph,li 
the Gallup findings indicated 37% of the general public supported the original wording, 
28% did not with 35% undecided.  The results, whilst inconclusive, could have 
suggested public ownership might be a strong campaign theme for Labour.  Ironically, 
writing on the same day in another newspaper not generally popular with party 
members, veteran columnist Keith Waterhouse developed this point when he 
commented: 
 'What privatisation now means, in the public mind, is a licence to print money to pay 
 the bonanza and other jackpot benefits of chief executives.  Privatisation is now 
 private in the sense of hands off, keep out.  And Tony Blair chooses this moment to 
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 tour the country persuading the brothers and sisters to ditch Clause 4.  Some sense of 
 timing.'lii 
 
In marked contrast to the Gallup polling figures, a previous Fabian Society sponsored 
research series of relevance to the Clause Four debate had received much greater 
attention in the anti-Conservative press.  Commissioned during the Smith leadership, 
the pamphlets were written by modernising MP Giles Radice and Fabian Director of 
Research Stephen Pollard.  Each used focus groups to analyse the political attitudes of 
voters in marginal seats who had considered supporting Labour in 1992 but in the event 
stayed Conservative.  The work made an impact by, as Tony Blair put it in opening his 
1945 anniversary lecture, 'turning the attention of the party towards lost voters in the 
South'.liii Reflecting their geographical bias the series was known as 'Southern 
Discomfort' and provided Labour modernisers with a supply of useful data.  All three 
editions proved influential in focusing minds on their call for the symbolic dropping of 
Clause Four as a demonstration of the party's desire to change.  Their importance in the 
subsequent debate was later acknowledged by the Society in its promotional literature: 
 'The Fabian Society paved the way for the introduction of ”One Member, One Vote” 
 and the new statement of aims and values which replaced the old Clause Four.  Our 
 path-breaking series of pamphlets on the attitudes of swing voters in the south of 
 England- the “Southern Discomfort” series- prepared the ground for the 
 modernisation of Labour's Constitution and policies.’liv 
 
Whilst the official National Executive Committee report referred to the party's loss of 
electoral support amongst a multitude of demographic groups,lv the pamphlets focused 
on people in social categories C1/C2, resident in target seats mainly in the south-east, 
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aged 25-50 with children.  Despite this narrow base and the problems associated with 
extrapolating too much from focus groups, the material appeared in several reports and 
features, creating the impression that it was a scientific type source of considerable 
authority.  Quite apart from the choice of sample selection and dangers of undertaking 
qualitative research in isolation from traditional forms of polling, little was made of the 
potential psychological need of participants to justify their previous vote for the 
Conservatives with overly negative commentaries about Labour. 
 
More relevant to the immediate debate over Clause Four were the research exercises 
commissioned by some of the trades unions.  Like the Southern Discomfort work, the 
results appeared to reinforce the moderniser case.  The first survey research, organised 
by the consultancy Union Communications, suggested as many as 72% of members in 
affiliated unions wanted the constitutional changes to be made.lvi  Another poll, 
conducted for the AEEU, resulted in a response of 91% in favour of revising the Clause. 
Considered in relation to the conflicting Gallup data in the Daily Telegraph,lvii the 
statistics support the notion that the question was a key factor in determining outcome, 
an issue of importance when it came to the decision by others to ballot their 
memberships.  The move to hold what effectively amounted to a referendum on the 
party constitution was a significant step away from a representative to a more direct 
form of internal democracy.  Like the switch to 'One Member, One Vote' for leadership 
and candidate elections, the move has implications for the future conduct and outcome 
of party debates. 
 
The communications' workers union, the only union to go ballot, won a significant vote 
of confidence for the modernisers' plans.  Both The Guardian and Daily Mirror gave 
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prominent coverage to the result.lviii  By contrast other executives and local parties 
conducted their consultation exercises through the usual constitutional means of 
meetings and workplace liaison.  By March 91 CLPs had declared their support for the 
maintenance of the existing Clause Four,lix a factor which probably loomed large in the 
leadership's ad hoc decision to encourage constituency parties to ballot members in 
place of the previously binding local General Committee system of voting.lx  When two 
of the largest affiliates, Unison and the TGWU, remained firm in their commitment to 
the Webb wording, an editorial in the Daily Mirror denounced them as 'undemocratic'.lxi  
Some party modernisers questioned the legitimacy of these affiliates' position in the 
party: 'It is the votes of ordinary members which have driven the Clause IV change, not 
the pronouncements of trade union executives'.lxii  The same issue of the LCC 
newsletter went on to list results from the few hundred constituency parties who had 
voted for change as against the handful who did not. 
 
The decision by the TGWU not to ballot members led to a rift between General 
Secretary Bill Morris and the Labour leadership.lxiii  More dramatically it also provided 
the impetus for a serious challenge by moderniser Jack Dromey for Morris's position 
later in the year.lxiv  Other acrimonious episodes during the debate formed the basis of 
press reports which tended to favour the leadership.  In particular the near half of 
Labour MEPs who publicly declared their allegiance to Clause Four with a front-page 
advert in The Guardian on the day Blair came to address them in Strasbourg were 
labelled 'Stalinist' in the same paper's editorial the following day.lxv Similarly much was 
made of the leader's denunciation of those behind the advert as 'infantile 
incompetents'.lxvi  By contrast to the impression given in the press, Alex Falconer, one 
of the MEPs Blair targeted, contended the meeting had not been so one-sided.lxvii 
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Other stories appearing in the press helped strengthen the case presented by Blair.  
Towards the end of January, The Observer reported that Blair had been on the 'warpath' 
at a recent meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party.lxviii  The following day both the 
Daily Mirror and The Guardian ran features underlining Blair's belief that unless 
Clause Four was reformed the party would lose the next election.lxix  Additionally 
significant was the selective reporting given different consultation results: whilst the 
Scottish party conference decision to support Blair made The Guardian front page and 
an editorial, the Greater London region vote against change two weeks later only 
merited a small item on the fifth page of the same paper.lxx  Similarly, favourable 
coverage followed endorsements of change from other sectional groups, notably two 
major conference meetings of the national sections for youth and women.  Despite the 
fact that both were representative rather than decision-making bodies, the results were 
interpreted by the press in an unambiguous way: 'Blair wins youth'lxxi and 'Labour 
women vote strongly for the new Clause 4'.lxxii 
 
In launching the debate over the Labour Party constitution in October 1994, Tony Blair 
could not be wholly sure his intention to re-write Clause Four would be successful.  
Modernisers' initial fears were confirmed when the Annual Conference voted to re-
affirm the existing wording 48 hours later.  Leadership anxieties were compounded by 
the decision of several CLPs, as traditionally represented by their General Committees, 
to vote against change.  Nevertheless the leadership won its case in spite of these 
setbacks and the fact that they had been unable to promote a new Clause Four for fear of 
appearing to pre-empt a decision early on in the consultation period.  At the special 
April 1995 meeting the vote registered in favour of change was 66% to 34%.  The result 
overturned the previously binding 1994 conference decision which had supported the 
 26 
existing Webb version, albeit by a narrow margin of 51% to 49%.lxxiii 
 
Arguably the new party structures created during the Kinnock leadership played an 
important role in enabling Tony Blair and his allies to revise the party’s set of 
constitutional aims and values.  Central to this and other internal debates were those 
influential agenda-setting mass media popular with the Labour membership and those 
increasingly powerful agents of the leadership belonging to Blair’s office and core 
group of advisers.  It was a combination of these aides, their contacts in the media and 
selected usage of opinion research findings which helped to reshape the perceptions of 
those participating in the discussion.  Prior to winning the leadership Blair had 
expressed his ambivalence about the need to revise Clause Four not to mention the rest 
of the party’s aims and values.  In spite of having adopted a contradictory position 
within months of succeeding John Smith, Blair and his entourage were nevertheless able 
to govern the contours of the subsequent argument to the extent that they convincingly 
won it.  In the process they were able to marginalise opponents as well as several 
plausible alternative viewpoints. 
 
 
Conclusions. 
With the recent overhaul of party structures and the diminution of trades union input 
into policy decision, leadership elections and candidate selection, media and marketing 
driven agenda-setting has acquired greater importance in influencing the internal affairs 
of the Labour Party.  This trend has been complemented with the introduction of party 
referenda during the Clause Four debate, the defining moment of Tony Blair’s 
leadership whilst in opposition.  The move, designed to facilitate discussion throughout 
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the party and include the wider membership in the decision-making process, has 
afforded Blair and his aides even more control over debate.   
 
The diminuition in the party’s representative democracy has enabled the leadership to 
mobilise support for its case.  This has been done thanks in part to what Panebianco 
called ‘electoral professionals’, those specialist advisers charged with managing 
strategy.  In turn these actors have been helped by their contacts in those media closely 
associated with the party and through judicious use of polling research which suggests 
the leadership’s view reflects that of the ‘opinion electorate’, that is those voters deemed 
essential to any electoral success. 
 
The emergence of ‘New’, hierarchical Labour party is by no means an isolated 
development.  In his original study Robert Michels identified the role the press could 
play in helping party leaderships to subjugate dissent and maintain control within their 
organisations.  Similarly, in his pioneering study, Leon Epstein pointed to emergence of 
professionalism as a means of party governance.  More recently Panebianco has 
highlighted the central importance of media strategists and the selected readings of 
public opinion to the structure and management of debate within parties.  The thrust of 
these contributions, which have all been concerned with European cases, has been 
recently complemented by studies of British politics which have pointed to the growth 
of ‘presidentialism’.lxxiv  Arguably marketing and the media have been central to this 
development. 
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